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Author’s note
This paper is a result of an independent study undertaken for the PRSP process and
poverty monitoring task teams of the Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA). The
views expressed are those of the author and members the study team, not of the SPA.
The paper also reports work in progress—its content has not yet benefited from full
discussion within the SPA.1
1 Introduction
How long will the enhanced HIPC initiative be remembered? When the history of
development comes to be written, will HIPC-II prove to have been more or less
influential than its almost accidental by-product, the poverty reduction strategy paper
(PRSP)? This paper has little to say about debt relief as such. But it bears on the
possibility that HIPC-II will pass into history mainly as the occasion when PRSPs were
born.
The implication is that something serious is at stake in the discussion around PRSPs,
something that goes beyond the possible impacts of international debt and its relief.
That is the starting point of this paper and of the study of experience in eight African
countries on which it draws.
The study, commissioned by the Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA), stems from
the belief that the obligation on countries to prepare a PRSP—introduced in 1999
alongside other conditions for access to enhanced HIPC relief—is at least potentially a
non-trivial change in the modalities of international development, one that deserves to
be watched particularly closely. Both from the point of view of the countries that are
significant recipients of concessional funding, and for the donor community, the PRSP
experience represents a significant challenge.
1.1 The nature of the issue
But it is important to be clear from the outset what sort of challenge is implied. The
phrase poverty reduction strategy paper has a literal meaning and an aura of solemnity
that are potentially deceptive. Some of the language in which PRSPs are currently being
discussed is strongly reminiscent of the early days of ‘development planning’, in the
1950s and 1960s, when the world seemed a simpler place than it does now. The concept
of a PRSP might seem to imply that the reduction of poverty is more straightforwardly
amenable to rational thinking and action than we know to be the case. Is there not a
dangerous element of naiveté in the concept, one that could sow the seeds of later
disillusionment?
There certainly is some basis for this concern. The possibility raised by PRSPs is not
whether the world has changed in some fundamental way, so that the obstacles to a
simple-minded ‘rational planning’ approach that we have come to recognize over the
years have suddenly disappeared. It is not the case that, once again, all we need is better
plans.
On the contrary, the PRSP challenge arises from the observation that the world remains
very much as it was. It stems from the almost unreserved failure of all previous
instruments and processes to achieve significant breakthroughs in the field of poverty
reduction in the poorest countries. It concerns the possibility that, against this
background of failure, a small adjustment in ways of doing certain things might make a
significant difference.
The adjustments in question are not so much about ‘planning’ as about appreciating
processes of structural change, particularly within the domestic societies and
governance institutions of poor countries, and their decisive influence on the outcomes2
of development efforts. It is by no means suggested that the need to make concessional
funding and debt relief conditional upon changes in policies and institutions within
recipient countries has disappeared. What is claimed is that a shift in the emphasis of
conditionality, focusing more on policy processes oriented to particular sorts of
outcomes, and less on specific preconditions, just might make a critical difference.
The origins of the PRSP proposals reflect some combination of:1
· disappointing poverty reduction performance in most highly indebted and aid-
dependent countries throughout the last 20 years, despite substantial changes in
policies and institutions;
· growing recognition of the importance of the national policy context for aid
effectiveness;
· increased awareness of the limitations of conventional conditionalities for
levering some of the critical changes;
· a search for new instruments with which to justify a major new debt-reduction
initiative.
The PRSP principles extend and largely incorporate the ideas previously developed
around the World Bank’s proposals for a country-level comprehensive development
framework. Key elements are:2
· policy thinking for poverty reduction should take the form of a country-led
strategy process, in which government engages in dialogue with other
constituents of the national society, resulting in greater national ownership of the
decisions taken;
· it should be results- or outcome-oriented, starting from the analysis of poverty
and its causes and working backwards to the design of appropriate policies;
· the thinking should be comprehensive in its coverage of different macro, sectoral
and cross-sectoral issues that affect poverty reduction processes and prospects;
· the basis for international support should be a form of partnership,i nw h i c ha l l
funding sources are drawn together in a coordinated way around a strategy
developed under the leadership of the recipient government;
· this is visualized as a medium- to long-term process, implying a need for
medium-term commitments as well as careful consideration of appropriate
timing, performance criteria and monitoring arrangements.
Underlying the PRSP idea is the notion that ‘process conditionality’ (Foster et al. 1999),
by introducing these elements into national policy processes for poverty reduction, can
1 A vast literature might be cited under each topic; some representative landmarks would be World
Bank (2001), White and Killick (2001), World Bank (1998), Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren (2001),
Killick (1998) and Fostere ta l .(1999).
2 This draws on World Bank (2000) and IMF and IDA (1999, 2000).3
succeed where previous forms of conditionality have failed. The implicit ‘hypothesis’ is
that refocusing IFI conditionality, in the context of HIPC-II and new lending
instruments (the IMF’s poverty reduction and growth facility—PRGF, and the Bank’s
poverty reduction support credit—PRSC), will be capable of generating greater national
ownership of poverty reduction policies (and the other PRSP principles listed above),
and that this in turn will lead to greater effectiveness and sustainability in anti-poverty
action.
Whether this hypothesis is true or not is the central question confronted by any study of
the early experience with PRSPs. The study that this paper draws on is no exception.
However, the scope of the study is limited by its timing and the terms of reference
drawn up by the SPA task teams that commissioned the work.
1.2 Scope of the work
The study is intended to investigate the extent to which poverty reduction policies,
programmes, practices and monitoring systems are being institutionalized in selected
African countries. It is intended to provide some early feedback on the degree to which
the new elements introduced into IFI conditionality by the enhanced HIPC framework
are leading to poverty reduction plans that benefit from greater country ownership and,
therefore, promise to be more effective.
The enquiry has been focused on three main topics:
· the attitudes, commitments and plans of governmental and non-governmental
stakeholders, including multilateral and bilateral donor agencies;
· the institutional changes that are being introduced, especially in respect of:
– public financial management
– participation in policy making and other aspects of the governance framework;
· the development of monitoring and information systems.
The research is based on case studies of the experience of eight countries: Benin,
Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda and Tanzania. It is being carried
out by an international team coordinated by the Overseas Development Institute,
London. Details of the research teams conducting the country studies and the synthesis
work are provided at Annex 1.
The above topics are being investigated in two phases, over a fifteen-month period.
Phase 1 (September 2000–January 2001) was an initial scoping exercise, designed to
identify key issues for further investigation, and provide a baseline against which to
gauge later developments. This was based on in-country interviews and documentary
work of about two weeks’ duration. A report on progress and preliminary findings was
presented to the SPA and made available on the World Bank and ODI websites in
November/December 2000.
Phase II of the work (February–November 2001) has involved more extended work in
the study countries, with somewhat widened terms of reference and a larger effort of4
analysis and synthesis. A third progress report was presented in May 2001, including
some early findings from Phase II. This paper draws mainly on the principal themes of
these previous reports. The final report of the study, including country reports and two
synthesis chapters, is due for submission at the end of September.
1.3 The nature of the evidence
The study is inductive and exploratory. It is naturally constrained by the selection of
case-study countries and by the timing of their HIPC-II and PRSP processes. All of the
study countries are in principle eligible for enhanced HIPC relief, except Kenya, where
concessional loans were not available for much of the past decade, and a major
accumulation of domestic debt has taken place instead. Initially, Ghana opted not to
seek HIPC-II relief but has now, under a new government, changed its position.
The remaining countries have been preparing PRSPs with a view to HIPC-II relief. All
submitted their interim PRSPs (I-PRSPs), satisfying the main conditions for the HIPC-II
decision point during the middle months of 2000. Tanzania was permitted to proceed
quickly to complete and submit its full PRSP in 2000, although at the time of writing
HIPC-II completion awaits the PRSP’s first annual review. The other countries have
been moving at different speeds towards presentation of their PRSPs during 2001, with
the expectation that this process will be finished in nearly all cases by the end of the
year.
The research for the study has, therefore, coincided with quite early stages in the
country processes. In most cases, the scoping exercise took place during the culmination
of the I-PRSP phase, while the follow-up work has coincided with a fairly advanced
stage in the consultations and other work on the full paper.
The country teams conducted between 25 and 50 interviews each in the scoping phase.
Interviewees were treated both as ‘key informants’ and as stakeholders whose opinions
on different subjects are of substantive interest to the study. Some care was taken with
the conduct of the interviews and their interpretation. In all cases, the picture that
emerged came from the combined and cross-checked testimony of the different actors,
not from the views of individuals on their own.
The lists of interviewees appended to the country reports include senior government
officials with responsibility for the PRSP process or poverty monitoring; officials of
other echelons of government (e.g., line ministries); parliamentarians, including
members of opposition parties; private business representatives; heads of civil-society
membership organizations; leaders of national or international NGOs; independent
consultants or academics; technical assistance personnel; and embassy, donor-agency
and IFI staff. In all cases, interviews were conducted with individuals in several
different categories.
The coverage of relevant stakeholders was by no means complete at the end of the
scoping exercise. In Phase II of the study, informants have been re-interviewed and
efforts have been made to widen the range of stakeholders consulted, with greater
efforts to include those living outside the national capital and formal ‘development’
spheres. Coverage of donor perceptions and intentions has also been increased.5
1.4 Arriving at an overview
An obvious difficulty facing the synthesis of findings in an exercise such as this is that
the different countries are indeed different, and much of the interest in the reports is
embedded in the detail. We have attempted to handle this by entering key information
and ‘pointers’ from the country studies in summary matrices. The main text then
provides an overview of the analysis in the country reports, and discusses the issues that
are emerging for at least significant sub-groups of countries. We include here as
Annex 2 the summary matrix from the May 2001 progress report.
In sections 3-5, we summarize the study’s emerging findings in the three main areas of
its terms of reference. Section 2 provides a few essential elements of background, while
also signalling a strongly emerging additional theme of the study—that ‘politics
matters’.
2 The country context: politics matters
2.1 Some common features
The country contexts we are concerned with are obviously varied and contain some
significant contrasts. The commonalities are also very significant from the point of view
of a study of the institutionalization of poverty reduction strategies. One set of shared
features concerns broad characteristics of the national institutional framework; another
concerns the manner in which ‘poverty reduction’ has typically been addressed in the
recent past.
Briefly stated, in all cases we are dealing with semi-democratized states, with quite
fragmented policy processes (characterized by low coordination between different
centres of decision making, and between policy formulation and implementation).
Domestic politics tends to be patronage-based, with fragmented party systems and weak
civil societies. The countries are all characterized by high levels of institutional aid
dependency, and correspondingly low accountability to domestic actors. Public
expenditure and revenue management systems have, at least until recently, been only
weakly driven by public policy objectives. Administrative systems have similarly been
characterized by low morale and weak performance incentives. These features affect in
obvious ways the range of outcomes that can reasonably be expected from PRSPs.
In no case except Rwanda is the PRSP process the first experience in developing a
national poverty reduction strategy. However, in all the countries covered by the study,
these previous efforts have taken a form that differs systematically from the PRSP
approach in two respects at least. First, poverty reduction was typically handled as a
special activity, added on to existing programmes and thus requiring special structures
and activities. Second, the emphasis has been on providing a new focus for attracting
project funding, not on influencing the mainstream processes of public resource
allocation through the national exchequer.
That having been said, previous poverty plans have in a number of cases absorbed
considerable national effort. Sometimes, this has included broad participation by non-
governmental interest groups and experts. In some cases, previous plan processes are
considered to have acquired extensive national ‘ownership’, according to the criterion6
that large numbers of stakeholders are aware of them and have some degree of
identification with them. This is not the only possible or perhaps the most important
criterion that needs to be applied. However, the fact that some previous exercises in
national poverty planning do benefit from a sense of national ownership at this level, is
an important feature of the context into which PRSPs are being placed.
2.2 Politics matters!
Underlying this study is a belief that poverty reduction policy is, for better or worse,
embedded in living political systems. This implies that the PRSP ‘experiment’ will
work through the political systems and policy processes of the countries concerned, or it
will not work at all. PRSPs will either engender new relationships and dynamic
processes within countries that result in poverty policies being handled in a new and
more effective way, or they will not.
What happens in this respect will be a very political issue, in two senses. First, for all
their limitations, formal political systems are a powerful influence on what happens in
every country. Second and probably more important, the informal arrangements and
understandings that determine policy and its implementation are also ‘political’, not
merely technical.
There is a steadily maturing consensus in the study team on these points. They formed
part of the initial thinking of the team. But the perspective has been confirmed and
reinforced as the country evidence has come in. From the scoping studies and the first of
the completed Phase II reports, it is clear that the PRSP experience in several countries
richly exemplifies the proposition. Three contrasting examples are worth mentioning.
In Ghana, the country’s first electoral transfer of power from one party to another has
brought in a new government that has reversed the previous position on ‘joining HIPC’,
thereby substantially increasing the stakes in the PRSP process. While not naturally the
party of the poor (given its electoral base and ideological inclinations) the NPP’s
declared positions on economic management and governance issues could imply a
significantly different approach to the PRSP. The main doubts on this score arise from
the possibility that there is a deeper level of political institutionality that will in due
course reassert itself (what political scientists call patrimonial democracy). The
structures that affect and limit policy implementation also remain in place to a large
extent.
In Kenya, the PRSP process that was developing during the scoping phase of the study
benefited from the boost to transparent public sector management given by the placing
of the change team of independent Kenyans in key government positions. During the
fieldwork for Phase II, the underlying system of presidential rule reasserted itself. The
majority of the change team departed and the PRGF agreement with the IMF is again
suspended for non-compliance. In this way, the stop-go cycle of Kenya’s external
financial relations has re-emerged. None of this necessarily means that the Kenyan
PRSP will have no benefits; but it does serve as a reminder that the benefits will be
constrained—but also enabled—by Kenya’s particular political realities.
In Tanzania (as also in Rwanda), the political situation of the incumbent authorities has
generally favoured a strong governmental commitment to the PRSP. As the study team7
reported in 2000, HIPC-II and the PRSP helped to ensure an electoral victory for
Tanzania’s CCM (while in Rwanda these elements blend well with the government’s
approach to national reconciliation). A strengthened concern in the Phase II reporting
for Tanzania is about the degree to which political interest in poverty reduction is
narrowly driven by the economic and political attractions of debt relief under HIPC-II,
and will weaken very substantially after completion. This has contributed to the flavour
of recent discussions about the timing of the first annual PRSP review, on which
completion depends.
The final report of the study will be looking for patterns across all eight cases in the
relationship between the national political context and PRSP processes, as well as
firming up the suggestions on systematic relationships between PRSPs and other reform
processes (section 4 below).
3 Initial processes and stakeholder responses
Four issues to do with the initial responses of governments and other stakeholders to the
PRSP initiative attracted the interest of the study team in the scoping phase:
· variations in the reception of the initiative across countries, and possible sources
of these differences, other than mere timing;
· hesitations about getting involved in PRSP processes among bilateral donors in
several countries, and country concerns about ongoing donor behaviour
considered inconsistent with the new country-ownership agenda;
· an upgrading of responsibility for poverty reduction policy, which has tended to
shift into ministries of finance, becoming more closely linked to central resource
allocation decisions, and treated as less exclusively the business of social sector
or welfare ministries;
· the extreme burdens being placed on limited capacity in most countries, with
lessons from some countries that careful use of extra-governmental technical
capacity and well-managed external assistance can mitigate the problem.
Most initial findings on these points have been confirmed and deepened. In other
instances, early concerns have been revealed as transitory, reflecting difficulties in the
first stages of the PRSP process which have since been overcome. We discuss the four
issues in turn.
3.1 Differences across countries
First, the differences between countries are now less striking, as more of them have
proceeded from the interim PRSP (I-PRSP) stage to preparing full PRSPs. In the
scoping study, we found little outright opposition to the idea of a PRSP but quite varied
perceptions across countries about aspects of implementation. The relationship between
what was apparently required for the PRSP in comparison with previous exercises in
national strategy formulation for poverty reduction was a particular subject of concern.
The irritation at having to ‘start over’ that was found in a few countries in late 20008
(notably Mali and Malawi) appears to have become more muted as those countries have
become more fully engaged in PRSP preparation.
This has been helped in those countries and perhaps more generally by fuller and more
accommodating discussions between the national authorities and the IFI missions on
how to handle the strengths (especially in terms of process) and the deficiencies
(especially terms of policy frameworks) of previous poverty reduction strategies. It also
appears generally the case that IFI missions have adopted a much more subtle and
discriminating posture on guiding the process and content of full PRSPs than they did
with the interim documents.
3.2 Donor responses
On the second point, bilateral donors, the EC and the UN system have become more
closely and consistently engaged with PRSP processes in the study countries, with
significant policy changes in some cases (e.g. France). However, the level of buy-in still
varies between agencies, and is likely to prove very sensitive to the credibility of the
PRSP process and the quality of the final document.
A topic of some importance is the preparedness of donors to actually change the pattern
of their aid delivery in response to the PRSP. This might include a decision to channel
substantial funds as budget support with a three-year commitment, as eight donors are
now doing in Tanzania and Mozambique, and the EC is committed to doing more
generally. It would also include more limited commitments: to integrate projects with
sector programmes, report project funding more efficiently, join sector-wide approaches
and other common-basket arrangements, commit more funds for longer periods of time
and subordinate agency country strategies to PRSPs.
There is, as yet, little to suggest any emerging trends in these directions, other than
those mentioned (which antedate PRSPs in several cases). It is, however, likely that the
PRSP experience will increase the perception within countries that donors should match
the new rhetoric of national ownership with changes in practice.
3.3 Taking poverty out of the social sector ghetto
The pattern described in the third bullet point above has been amply confirmed. PRSP
preparation has resulted, in one country after another, in the responsibility for poverty
reduction policy being taken over by ministries of finance. While not universally
popular, this has the effect that poverty is more effectively ‘mainstreamed’ within
government policy.
The one country in the sample where the institutional division of labour for leading the
PRSP process remained unsettled in 2000 (Benin) has now resolved it in the expected
way, with the ministry of finance taking the lead role and planning providing support.
Effective linkage of poverty planning to central resource allocation is, of course, another
question (section 4 below), but the institutional division of labour is now more
favourable to that. Together with removing poverty reduction from the limited field of
action of the so-called social sectors, and reviving strategic thinking about role of
sectors such as agriculture, this is one simple but definite gain from the PRSP initiative
that is unlikely to be taken away whatever the subsequent developments.9
3.4 Capacity and time
Finally, capacity problems and the tightness of the deadlines imposed by the HIPC-II
timetable remain recurrent themes in the country reports. Against this, examples can be
given of viable ways of working on PRSPs that enhance capacity without compromising
national ownership fatally. However, a more serious problem that will be documented in
our final report is the way ‘process overload’ threatens to swamp the gains that have
been made. The capacity that exists to undertake more effective anti-poverty planning
and coordinate external assistance to this end is seriously over-stretched almost
everywhere by the multiplicity of review processes, to which both HIPC-II and the
PRSP initiative have contributed additional dimensions.
4 The potential for institutionalization
4.1 PRSPs and public-sector reforms
One of our earliest findings looks set to be a major theme of the final report. This is that
the ability of the PRSP initiative to shift national poverty policies in the direction of
better design and implementation is critically influenced by the density of previous
reform effort. This refers particularly to reforms of public finance management, such as
those associated with outcome-oriented budgeting and medium-term expenditure
frameworks (MTEFs). It also includes public-sector reforms intended to shift staff
performance incentives in a more results-based direction, while also improving
transparency and accountability.
The degree to which such reforms were already in place and making headway was
found in the scoping study to be a principal determinant of stakeholders’ understanding
of the point of the PRSP exercise. Now, we are inclined to assert more strongly that
PRSPs are unlikely to achieve very much on their own, but depend for their impact on
the existence of parallel changes in government financial and staff management
arrangements. There may be a case for seeing PRSPs as one part of a jig-saw puzzle, of
which the centrepiece is the sort of exercise in medium-term financial planning
associated with MTEFs or medium-term fiscal frameworks.
At the very least, the Phase II reports completed so far are documenting the usefulness
of a close and synergistic relation between PRSPs and MTEFs and associated budget
reforms in several countries. Negatively, the stalled implementation of MTEFs in Ghana
and Malawi is a substantial obstacle to making PRSPs effective in those countries. And
the fact that cash budgets still have to be resorted to—preventing the MTEF ceilings
actually leading to predictable disbursements—is a drag on the implementation of
Tanzania’s PRSP.
The contention that MTEFs should be regarded as the centre-piece does not mean that
there is no added value from PRSPs. Apart from ‘mainstreaming’ poverty, the PRSP
provides the essential vision on how the government proposes to be more effective in
tackling poverty with existing and potentially available resources. More important,
given what is known about the actual ways policy is made and implemented in the
countries in the study, it opens public debate on these issues. It creates policy spaces in10
which more voices can be heard and chronically neglected policy bottlenecks can be
exposed to a wider national constituency.
4.2 Changes resulting from widened participation in policy
Creating that wider constituency is the job of the process dimension of the PRSP, which
is arguably the most important dimension. If PRSPs prove more effective and
sustainable than previous poverty reduction plans, it will be not only because they are
better linked into mainstream resource allocation processes, but also because they are
the product of a more inclusive and participatory style of policy making. So, what are
the indications on the feasibility and possible effects of a genuinely participatory
approach to PRSP preparation?
In December 2000, we reported limited findings on the basis of I-PRSP experience and
argued for modest expectations about the depth and quality of the participatory
processes that would be involved in the preparation of full PRSPs. On the other hand,
we suggested there could be significant second-round effects. That is, as a consequence
of the PRSP initiative, NGOs and civil society organizations would be prompted to
become organized, and develop capacities for policy dialogue, overcoming previous
deficiencies in these respects in time to participate more effectively in subsequent policy
debates and PRSP reviews.
Both expectations have been confirmed by the completed Phase II country studies.
However, there are some partial exceptions on both counts. Even experienced national
observers of the process in Kenya regard it as having been, by all relevant standards,
wide, deep and strongly ‘owned’ by the participants, if not by the national political
leadership. Stakeholder committees arising from this process are expected to have an
ongoing role, a highly encouraging development.
In most of the countries that have reached the same stage in the PRSP process, there are
reports of a greater orientation to poverty as a policy issue, and efforts to identify
capacity-building needs, among the larger NGOs. An exception seems to be Ghana,
where a galvanising of NGOs for policy dialogue occurred to some degree under the
World Bank’s structural adjustment participatory review initiative (SAPRI), but has not
entered a new phase with the PRSP. This is consistent with the general finding for
Ghana that the PRSP has not appeared a sufficiently weighty matter in the
consciousness of the government and the general public to produce more than marginal
policy shifts. In Ghana, institutional changes appear not to be on the agenda as a result
of the PRSP, which is not to say that improvements in governance, with potential
benefits for the poor, will not occur for other reasons.
4.3 The non-involvement of parliaments
A difficult question that the study team is still grappling with, is whether—in the cases
where they are definitely occurring—the above kinds of spin-offs from the PRSP design
process will come to be regarded as significant transformations in the way countries
make policy. They could easily be portrayed negatively just as a new means by which
donors ventriloquize their ideas about development. However, we think it would be
premature to discount what is happening in this way, particularly in countries like11
Kenya that have substantial civil societies and private sectors, independent mass media
and a large intelligentsia.
PRSPs have tended not to involve parliaments, as institutions, in a major way, and this
too has prompted some debate within the study team. We think there may be some
justifications for this, based on the limited powers of parliaments in the Westminster
tradition to overturn executive decisions, and on the shortcomings of many of these
legislatures as democratic institutions. It should not be a question of principle,
mechanically applied, that national ownership implies parliamentary scrutiny at the
planning stage, regardless of the quality of the institutions concerned. We nonetheless
think that in most cases it would be unwise to allow parliaments to be as uninvolved as
they have been until now. A good mix of creativity and realism should be applied to this
issue as to others.
5 PRSP monitoring: tasks ahead
Monitoring arrangements are an important focus of this study, but they have been
generally the last thing to be considered within PRSP processes. Even in the advanced
drafts of full PRSPs, the proposals under this heading are rather thin and problematic. It
continues to be the case that there is comparatively little to report, and that what there is
to report is not particularly positive (although this is not surprising, in view of the
background).
On the plus side, the fact that stakeholder committees look like remaining mobilized in
some countries on a continuing basis is potentially very important. More worrying is the
observation that in some countries, rather heavy weather is being made of setting up
quite an elaborate monitoring ‘system’ as if the main problems were purely technical.
This could result in more fundamental questions, to do with data quality and data use,
being neglected.
A positive feature that is in danger of becoming a negative one is the explosion of
activity on new household surveys and participatory poverty assessments to measure
final poverty outcomes and impacts. While this is good and important in enabling better
diagnostic work, feeding into better policy designs, the relative neglect of both survey-
based and participatory techniques for quick feedback on implementation processes is
regrettable.
In the plan documents, the selection of indicators continues to be rather indiscriminate.
This relates as much to weaknesses in the plans as to monitoring issues as such.
Although they purport to be strategic, the documents—not unexpectedly—are typically
weak in the ‘middle’: they do not explore very well how the prioritized actions can be
expected to be better at achieving the outcome objectives than similar actions have in
the past. The critical intervening variables have not been identified, so that it is not clear
what are the critical things that need to be monitored.
Monitoring cannot solve this problem. Nevertheless, the continued involvement of
PRSP stakeholders in arrangements PRSP monitoring could provide points of entry
back into the strategic debate. If neglected and difficult issues are constantly being
raised in a relatively high-profile way, incentives to the better conceptualization and12
more effective implementation of measures affecting poverty reduction could improve.
Examples of arrangements that are capable of working in this kind of way will be
documented in our final report.
6 Conclusions
A number of points of concern have been introduced or underlined by the above
discussion. The most notable is the threat or actuality of ‘process overload’. It seems
that IFI staffs are now being fairly widely credited with delicate handling of PRSP
drafting processes as such. On the other hand, the range of joint reviews involving
national officials with the IFIs, other multilaterals and bilateral agencies is regarded as
being seriously out of hand—particularly in some of those countries that have moved
furthest towards the PRSP approach. Further thought clearly needs to be given to
merging review processes.
We are not yet in a position to state what will be the conclusions of the study on the
deeper questions that it intends to address. However, from what has been said already it
is evident that the adoption of PRSPs has brought some limited but important gains in
all cases. The mainstreaming of poverty reduction—its integration with macro policy
and with the budget—is a palpable step forward. The gains are stronger in some
countries than in others, but for reasons that can be specified. Also, the most important
positive changes may turn out to be different across countries—more to do with central
resource allocation and expenditure monitoring arrangements in some countries, more
to do with opening new spaces for fundamental policy debate in others.
In the final report, we expect to develop a discussion of how far ‘ownership’ is an
effective concept for capturing what important changes are resulting from the new style
of IFI conditionality. An account will be given of the way the PRSP processes in the
eight countries shape up in terms of the different dimensions of ownership identified in
the literature on policy-based lending. However, the country study teams have found the
concept slippery and unsatisfactory in many respects. An effort will be made to take the
implicit hypothesis underlying the PRSP initiative—that ownership is critical to the
effectiveness and sustainability of anti-poverty policies—and recast it in more robust
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New developments and emerging themes by country (from progress report 3)







untested on poverty (not the
natural party of the poor) and
break with patrimonialism may
not be sustained. Previous
decision on HIPC-II overturned,
giving new importance to PRS
(target Oct 01)
IFI behaviour correctly arms-
length, but stakes now raised.
Conditionalities likely to cascade
rather than be reduced. Donor
good will and coordination within
SWAps and CDF; but little sign of
changes in volume and pattern of
aid, partly because HQ-
determined, but depends a bit on
credibility of PRS.
Expected impacts reduced by
weaknesses of key institutions,
NDPC and MoF (respect for
technical units notwithstanding).
Collapse of MTEF and poor budget
execution under previous
government is a serious blow. Core
teams for PRS drafting don’t
correspond with structure of
government; weak influence on line
ministries likely as a result.
Consultation top-down and non-
consensual. CSOs more frustrated
because election has raised
expectations




for which some local
demand; but statistics
outside the PRS loop.
NDPC has poor record on
policy monitoring, and
now starting afresh.
PRSP seen as moderately
important for policy and
awareness, but substantial
institutional changes implied by
study ToRs unlikely. Danger of
having no more impact than
old-style development plans;




accountability trends that liable
to benefit the poor. Need to






Now the only non-HIPC country
in the sample. Political context
dominated by Moi succession
issue. PRS was on track for
endorsement in Apr 01; but
PRGF now suspended, and
change team removed—
confirming real constitution
based on presidential rule.
PRS process has stimulated
debate in mass media, not all
favourable but good for profile.
Some indications that poverty will
be picked up in more party
manifestos. Donor buy-in
substantial, thanks mainly to
confidence in the qualified,
independant Kenyans in the
change team. Also, simultaneous
introduction of PRS and MTEF
helped synergy. Donor
coordination and restraint
enhanced since Phase 1 report,
and this needs to be
institutionalized.
A foothold gained for the idea that
poverty reduction should be
mainstreamed through the budget,
not in special funds controlled by
president’s office and projects that
serve local patronage. A national
constituency exists favouring role of
conditionalities in achieving such
shifts, which become irreversible.
Consultation on PRS quite deep,
wide and socially owned,
considering time and other
constraints; NGO organized and
donor financed through Treasury.
Nationally controversial, with
important networking gains and
raised expectations. NGO capacity
needs for policy work identified.
Although a rationale may exist for
by-passing parliament, it is not clear
that this is legitimate or wise.
Little progress so far.
Need to educate
stakeholders on role
monitoring can play in
increasing credibility of
PRS and incentives for
achievement of its goals.
Strategic selection of
indicators of progress,




countries and district level.
Stop-go cycle of aid and
concessional finance not about
to end. PRS lacks high-level
political ownership, but has
opened up some areas of
government and brought
national stakeholders into the
aid relationship in a new way.
The consequences of that
remain to be seen. Neglect of
parliament as an institution
needs to be reversed, even if
many MPs will remain resistant
to what is seen as donor-driven
process. Final judgements on
Kenya depend on a view of
how policy change occurs in














New developments and emerging themes by country (from progress report 3)







Timing good for Rwanda,
boosting the transition from
emergency relief to
development. Outcome much




reduction as key to pacification.
Capacity very weak and reliant on
UNDP and DFID support.
Disappointingly, French and
kinyarwanda translation of
I-PRSP only available Apr 01, so
many stakeholders not informed.
Some other learning by
MINECOFIN on how hard it is to
get involvement and buy-in. PPA
and policy relevance exercises
under way, but lack linkage to
national consultation on causes of
disunity.
Importance to PRS and wider donor
buy-in of improvements in public
finance management is increasingly
recognized, but the latter expected
to take many years—still training-










HIPC signing assisted CCM
landslide, but no real policy
engagement with poverty by
any party. Zanzibar affecting
otherwise good aid climate.
PRS endorsed Nov 00; first
review imminent but likely
delayed. Concern that incentive
will weaken after completion.
Eight donors now providing
budget support, with performance
assessment linked to PRS, but
concerns about ‘quality’ of
targets/indicators. PRGF review
led to less consultative budget
guidelines than usual, with weak
links to PRS. NGOs reworking the
gender content of PRS. Efforts to
‘popularize’ it. Current major
concern is institutionalizing the
PRS review process.
Continuity of core PRSP team, plus
ministerial changes, helpful. PRS
has brought poverty objectives into
public policy, esp. budget, sector
policies and discussions of
performance. But still long way to go
on budget—MTEF limited by cash
budgeting; weak integration of
SWAPs (because basket funds not
in budget, etc) and districts (which
are still working to old plans).
Consultative processes criticized at
the time but have led to
organization, coalition-building and
communication among CSOs.
Parliament had only 2-hour debate
on PRS; now heavily involved in
HIPC-related legislation (but this
may be one-shot). Patronage and
corruption remain entrenched;
parties still too unevenly balanced
for real debate.
Master plan being
formulated by 4 working
groups. Plenty activity on





heavy weather of design
of monitoring system, with
b i ge m p h a s i so nf o r m a l
framework.
PRS has been a step forward
for Tanzania, but impacts
limited by slow progress on
other fronts. Ownership is
happening in ‘parts’ of the
system, but increased
effectiveness does not
necessarily follow: PRS has
weak analysis of why the
actions proposed are the right
ones. Limited and fragile ‘policy
space’ opened up by the
process. All this constrained by
basic political realities, plus
‘process overload’ due to
PRGF, SWAps, UNDAF,
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Delayed start, Feb 01. Previous
tensions over relation of PRS to
existing UNDP-supported SNLP
resolved by agreement to
incorporate but add a macro
framework.
GoM wishes to assume
ownership but weak technical
skills imply a need for discreet
external support. Failure of last
t w oI M Fm i s s i o n sd u et oc o t t o n
disagreements is currently a
problem. Some donor interest in
being involved in PRSP
assessment and joint missions.
More bilaterals now supporting
the process (e.g. France). CSOs
participating but pace and
technical level high for them.
Speed is still a widespread
concern.
The fact that MoEF is not a powerful
ministry, capable of enforcing budget
discipline, is a problem. Despite MTEF in
theory since 1998, Bank has only moved
a little closer to channelling loans through
MoEF. Lessons of DAC Aid Review being
drawn on, and prospect of PRS becoming
reference document for aid coordination.
But move to budget support still a long
way off. Debate in free mass media, but
rather polarized in old-fashioned structural
adjustment terms. Parliament not
involved, but NGO-organized participatory
process. CSOs (largely NGOs) lack
legitimacy: ‘la societe civil, c’est moi!’
(president of the national parliament).
General perception in the
country is still that PRS is a
one-shot affair to benefit from
HIPC-II. However, the PRSP
process through the budget
may alter the behaviour of line
ministries, which are expecting
a big boost from HIPC savings.
Even if there is only a small
reduction in donors’ tendency
to build parallel structures and
fragment poverty reduction







Target Sept 01. PRS still viewed outside
government as donor-driven and
government-run. Individual CSO
participants were effectively
nominated. However, the process
has been adjusted in response to
stakeholder concerns
Improving budget processes and PEM,
including politicians’ roles, taken as key
area for PRS. Good learning from
previous MTEF implementation problems.
But, despite efforts to involve political
leadership, process is suffering from being
technically-driven. Immediate effects may
include distraction from sector planning
activities; and it remains to be seen
whether the PRS will push MTEF forward.
MPs hardly involved, but networking by
NGOs stimulated—i.e. some second-
round effects are expected.
Potential to overwhelm existing
capacity. Not clear that crucial
MTEF improvements needed
new conditionality or PRSP.
Nor clear that broad society-













PRS final draft much improved
on linkage of plans and
budgets. Submitted more or
less on time. Several other
concerns about its content.
Emerging tension between
ownership and donor enthusiasm
to be involved at promote their
concerns.
Eight donors now coordinating on budget
support, with link to PRSP process. Have
been further participation but all getting
tired; need for good ideas on how to
institutionalize it. Status vis-à-vis
parliament still unclear. 60 per cent of
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Preparatory studies for PRS
started Apr 01 after presidential
elections delayed everything.
Target: end of 01.
Struggle to lead between finance
and planning ministries now
resolved in favour of finance, but
no office or staff. Social peace,
not poverty, main election issue;
otherwise personalistic.
Two series of consultations, on sectoral
and regional basis, with donor
supporting each. Not much should be
expected from parliament, but there
would be costs from by-passing it.
PRSP should be seen as an
effort to cut through the
patronage basis of policy in
Benin, including the role of
project aid and NGOs in
feeding that. However, it is not
clear where the forces of
change will come from. Not

















How to explain differential
country responses? Previous
pattern and density of reform is
confirmed as important, but final
report needs to probe other
systematic differences.
Emerging debates on PRSC
conditionality, and on timing and
frequency of PRSP and PRGF
reviews to avoid disrupting budget
process. Residual confusion in
some countries that PRSP targets
are same as HIPC condition-
alities. No one clear on how
streamlining of conditions to be
achieved. Value in model of
Uganda poverty status report—
seeing how the plant is growing
without pulling it up by the roots.
Emerging argument for PRSPs to be
more modest—government’s vision and
priorities for additional activities at the
margin, with MTEF as centre-piece and
complete budget process, including
PRS and political oversight, as the
means of implementing it. There is still
added value from PRSPs—MTEFs are
policy neutral; PRSPs take poverty out
of the social sector, welfare ghetto and
open debate on how to be more
effective with actually and potentially
available resources. In all this, ideal
models, based on rationalistic view of
the policy process, need to be adjusted
to allow pragmatic adjustments. In
promoting accountability, keep in mind
success stories of poverty reduction
















Some modest gains are
already clear, but much more in
some countries than others.
‘Ownership’ is not particularly
helpful in characterising the
links that may be forming
between the IFIs’ new
approach and more effective
poverty reduction policies and
actions. ‘Mainstreaming’ is
better for some purposes.
Increased effectiveness lies
largely in the future. Drawing
definitive conclusions on
PRSPs will not be possible
within the period of this study—
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